In our last article we identified two surface-to-surface missile installations that have been built by the Burma Army. These employ missiles supplied by North Korea, and which are aimed at airbases in Thailand. Our information is that the site in the Maung-ma-gan Islands has been completed, while the facility at Ka-la-goke Island is still under construction.
We have now learned of two additional sites. The first is associated with the Burma Air Force’s Namsang Air Base, near Loilem in Shan State. This facility is reported to be fully operational: North Korean missiles are already emplaced. The second is under construction on Naw Ta Ya Mountain, which lies about eighty kilometers north of Myawaddy (thirty kilometers north of Mae La Refugee Camp).
Again, while we apologize for not providing photos of these facilities, or photocopies of missile purchase orders with North Korea, this is good intelligence. We were surprised that there was so little public discussion after the first article was released. Short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) in Burma are a significant political development.
We recognize that it is easier, and also less work, to assume that this is not true. However, some allegations are so serious that you are obliged to follow-up.
In October 2003, Kyodo News International reported that Burma was negotiating to buy missiles from North Korea. The source for the information was given as U.S. intelligence. The U.S., though, was only an intermediary. The actual source undoubtedly was Burmese.
Our situation is no different. Dictator Watch is also only an intermediary.
It was interesting that the day after our release, Burma’s junta, the SPDC, announced that “terrorists” were planning to disrupt the National Convention. We believe this was an effort to distract attention from the release.
We also note that the BBC recently received clandestine information from inside Burma about the refining of uranium ore, which confirms what we reported first (that such refining is underway). We’re right about the missiles, too, and at some point it will inevitably be confirmed as well.
The Asean Regional Forum has just ended. This issue should have been at the top of the agenda. Unfortunately, it was not considered (at least publicly).
We do understand, of course, why Thailand would be hesitant to openly discuss this new threat. The country is preoccupied with historic political events. Having said that, though, this threat, and relations with Burma in general, should be a major issue in the upcoming election.
The SPDC is a brutal dictatorship. It is increasingly well armed. It considers Thailand to be its number one enemy. This situation should be the country’s top foreign policy priority. The Thai government should completely re-evaluate its relationship with the regime.
In the last article we speculated that the missiles were Hwasong-6, a Scud variant with low accuracy. Since then, North Korea has conducted a number of tests of a new SRBM, apparently based on improved technology and which is much more accurate. While the Hwasong-6 might be available at discount prices, we would be surprised if the SPDC, flush with cash from its energy sales, did not at least express an interest in the new weapons. Procuring them would alter the threat analysis of a missile-armed Burma. With the more accurate technology, the SPDC would have a far greater capability to successfully attack Thai facilities.
On related subjects, we understand that the businessman Tayza has been making regular trips to Singapore, to purchase weapons. Political leaders from such nations as North Korea, Russia and China come to Burma and reach accords with Than Shwe. Tayza then travels to Singapore to meet lower-level officials to hammer out the transaction details. For example, this is how Burma acquired the MIG-29s from Russia and the T-72 tanks from Ukraine.
Singapore Foreign Minister George Yeo recently said that Burma having nuclear weapons was unlikely. This is clearly a diversion to protect the island/state’s role as the focal point for the arms trade. SPDC generals visit Singapore not only for its quality medical care; their representatives use the country to conclude arms deals.
(One wonders what the Thai government will think of Singapore, after learning that SPDC representatives are meeting their counterparts from North Korea, in Singapore, to buy missiles to be aimed at Thailand.)
We have also learned that a new class of eighty Defense Service Academy graduates left recently on a three-year scholarship program to Russia, to study nuclear technology. This certainly covers both power and weapons.
This boosts the total number of Burmese officers who have gone to Russia to study to approximately 3,000, since the program began in 2001-2002. Previously, the courses were only two years in length, the first six months of which were to study Russian. The language, though, is now taught at DSA in Burma. At the conclusion of the new three-year course, the graduates will receive doctorates in nuclear science.
Lastly, we want to comment on Ibrahim Gambari’s travels, to visit the SPDC’s international allies. While we would prefer not to be too critical, as he is just beginning his responsibilities as Special Advisor for the United Nations on Burma, his statement that there were “slow but positive steps” was ludicrous. How could he possibly believe this? Hasn’t he heard about the reports from the Free Burma Rangers, documenting yet more village burnings, murders and rapes? There is nothing positive at all, at least from the SPDC, taking place for the cause of freedom and democracy in Burma. His statement was an insult to all the people of the nation.
This type of start could easily lead one to conclude that Gambari will be a repeat of Razali, another series of years of false hopes, by which time the SPDC will have atomic weapons, and invincibility. We feel obliged to ask: Are Gambari, and his boss Ban Ki-moon, actually for the dictators?
As the purchase of ballistic missiles illustrates, the SPDC will never relinquish power willingly. There can be no transition to democracy until the generals are defeated militarily, or the people of Burma revolt. For the latter, the best strategy is a program of underground resistance activities, and where great care is taken not to be arrested. These activities should build to a country-wide general strike, which should also be accompanied by a call to rank and file Burma Army soldiers to turn on the generals, and through doing so again truly serve the nation.
This approach worked in Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine. Why not Burma?
Closing notes:
The tank sale occurred before Ukraine’s popular revolution. For all the people around the world planning to protest the SPDC on August 8th, please include a visit to a Chinese consulate if possible. If not, if you only protest at SPDC offices, please carry signs denouncing China (and send photos of your demonstration to Burma Digest).
BURMA: A THREAT TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND PEACE
Roland Watson
July 1, 2007
The following article is compiled from a number of sources. None of the specific items described, though, has been confirmed by additional independent sources. Nonetheless, we judge the information to be credible.
We would have liked to provide a smoking gun: an irrefutable document or photo. However, it would be extremely dangerous to attempt to secure such proof, and in any case we do not have the necessary resources.
Journalists would probably not run this without confirmation. We appreciate that, but we are not journalists. We are advocates, for freedom and democracy in Burma and against the military junta that rules the country, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). We have this information; we are confident it is correct; so we published it. The world needs to know.
The SPDC as international threat
Burma and the SPDC are a threat to international security and peace on many grounds, including that the country is one of the largest sources of refugees and human trafficking, and narcotics, and through both of communicable diseases and other public health and law enforcement problems. All of these undermine security and social order, particularly in Burma’s neighboring nations.
The country therefore was legitimately discussed in the United Nations Security Council, but the resolution against the SPDC that was prepared by the United States was vetoed by China and Russia, and also voted against by South Africa. These nations applied an outdated definition of international threat, one limited to military conflict and terrorism. They did this, for China and Russia, because they are the SPDC’s allies, in return for the right to pillage the nation’s natural resources (and for other reasons); and for South Africa, as a favor to China, befitting its similar status as Beijing’s client.
Burma is a threat to international security and peace for the above reasons, and also because of military and terrorist threats, as this article will describe. Our objective is to provide information that the United States can use to reopen the Security Council debate and to get China and Russia to back down.
Uranium trafficking
We have previously reported that the SPDC has a major program underway to exploit Burma’s reserves of uranium ore, including through its processing into the refined form known as yellowcake. This is being bartered to North Korea and Iran for their respective enrichment programs (in contravention of the Security Council sanctions on these nations). It is also likely being bartered to both China and Russia, in return for weapons from the former and weapons and nuclear assistance, including a reactor, from the latter.
For North Korea, while the country has made a commitment to close its reactors and end its atomic weapons program, the extension of this commitment to its secret but nevertheless well-established uranium enrichment activities is unclear. The U.S. itself has said that the shutdown will be a long, arduous process. There is no reason to expect that enrichment in the North will cease anytime soon. (Also, even if it did, Kim Jong-il would still have an interest in stockpiling yellowcake supplies.)
It is public knowledge that the SPDC wants to increase its hard currency inflows. (Its barter arrangements with Russia will not be sufficient to pay for the reactor.) It would therefore not be surprising if the junta seeks cash-paying customers for its uranium. Also, the market price is skyrocketing. It is now approximately $135 a pound, up from $7 in 2000. The nuclear power industry is also growing (unfortunately!), so this trend is unlikely to reverse. Some thirty countries now have nuclear power plants. An additional forty have research reactors. Thirteen are known to have enrichment facilities. This is an obvious business opportunity for the junta, which it clearly would not want to miss.
Dictator Watch has received first-hand information that SPDC representatives are looking for industrial customers for yellowcake in Bangkok, and that large quantities are available. This certainly represents a business that Thailand would prefer not to host. Furthermore, while the intended customers, power utilities, are in a sense legitimate, there is no guarantee that small quantities will not be diverted. For the right price, the SPDC would no doubt happily sell to terrorists. While yellowcake is not an ideal substance for a dirty bomb, due to its low radioactivity, it can be used for such a purpose, and anywhere in the world. The impact of a well thought out attack would be incalculable.
Missile launch facilities
Dictator Watch has further learned that the SPDC has constructed launch facilities for surface-to-surface missiles of North Korean origin. The sites are spaced along the Thai/Burma border, from archipelagoes in the Andaman Sea to Shan State. We are able to conclusively identify two of the sites:
- Maung-ma-gan Islands, about 20 miles off the coast of Tavoy
- Ka-la-goke Island, about 18 miles north of Ye
Construction of these facilities began in 2002-2003. Some are complete but others are still in progress. The sites contain launchers, storage buildings, a communications center, and air defense radar.
The missiles are surface-to-surface, with a maximum range of 300 miles (500 kilometers). We believe at least one if not two of the sites are already fully operational. The missiles are targeted at Thai air bases including in Bangkok, Phitsanulok, and elsewhere.
An April article in Asia Times said there were reports that the SPDC was interested in acquiring from North Korea the Hwasong SRBM (short range ballistic missile), a SCUD-type missile with a range of 500 kilometers (the Hwasong-6). It is likely that this is the missile that has been deployed.
The secret of the cargo in the North Korean ships that have been visiting Burma is now at least partially revealed. (We have also received information that North Korean ships, after docking at Thilawa Port in Burma, continued on to Iran.)
The Hwasong-6 is twelve meters tall and weighs 6400 kilograms. It carries a conventional high explosive warhead of up to 800 kilograms, although it is also capable of being armed with chemical or biological agents. North Korea reportedly has several hundred. The missile was first developed in the mid-1980s, tested in the early 1990s, and then phased out of production in the mid-1990s as the manufacturing of the longer range No-dong was scaled up. Hwasong-6 generally come in groups of four, one on the launcher and three on a reload carrier. They can also be launched from ships.
As we understand it, the SPDC’s military strategy is as follows. During the time of Ne Win and the BSPP (Burma Socialist Program Party), China was considered the main enemy (other than the people, particularly the ethnic nationalities). This changed in 1989, after the collapse of the Burma Communist Party. The designation of main enemy then shifted to Thailand, because of its alliance with and extensive materiel supply from the United States.
The Thai Army is well equipped, but it is not considered to be a serious threat because topographical features – the nature of the terrain – would prevent a deep penetration into Burma. The Tatmadaw also has large supplies of anti-tank weapons including SAMs and possibly TOW missiles. (Also, as we recently reported, the SPDC is working with North Korea to create a domestic production capability for 120 mm rockets.)
This confidence does not extend to the air. Burma has only two squadrons of MIG-29s, and its pilots are under-trained. Thailand has a large fleet of fighters, including some sixty F-16s and thirty F-5s. The F-16s are stationed in Khorat and Nakhon Sawan. They are also equipped with deadly ordinance, including AMRAAMS (advanced medium range air-to-air missiles), and their Thai pilots are highly skilled. In any combat, it would be a mismatch. The missiles are therefore viewed as an offset. In case of war, they would be fired at the Thai air bases in an attempt to disable the fleet.
One problem with this strategy, though, is that ballistic missiles have only limited accuracy. When launched, they initially follow programmed guidance but then continue to the target through a free fall trajectory. They are not capable of making flight adjustments en route, as with cruise missiles. The Hwasong-6 CEP (circular error probable) is not known, but it is estimated at 1-2 kilometers. CEP is the radius of the circle around the target in which fifty percent of fired missiles will land. This is of insufficient accuracy to effectively attack airbases – to be certain of damaging the runways – unless large quantities are used.
The missiles also have strategic implications beyond the possibility of conflict with Thailand. The SPDC has two main fears: a popular uprising, and a foreign military intervention led by the United States. For the first, they have imprisoned the democracy movement’s charismatic leader, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (who could instigate such a rebellion were she free and so inclined), and also other potential uprising leaders. The junta has further created local paramilitary forces, including the Swan Arr Shin militia, to brutally suppress mass popular expressions of discontent. Further, as we have also reported, the SPDC has a plan to initiate a military incident with Thailand, to create a distraction in the event of such an uprising.
For the second, and taken together with the SPDC’s nuclear aspirations and our recently announced news that again with North Korea it intends to produce sea-mines to have the ability to mine nearby shipping lanes, it seems clear that the junta is taking very seriously its defense against a possible U.S. organized intervention. To this we can add the emplacement of ballistic missiles. Viewed this way, the missiles are not only a defense against Thai unilateral action. More realistically, their basic function is to intimidate Thailand, to dissuade the country from offering meaningful assistance to the United States.
When combined these different items create a picture of a fanatical SPDC leadership that is prepared to go to any lengths to retain power. (Those people who are still calling for dialogue would be well advised to consider this fact.) Burma under the SPDC is unquestionably a threat to international security and peace, which threat must be addressed in the Security Council.
Political implications for Thailand
As with the trade in refined uranium, Thailand should not stand for being the target of ballistic missiles. The SPDC has taken advantage of the country. This has particularly been the case during the last five years, since Thaksin Shinawatra put his personal affairs above the interests of the nation. (One wonders if Thaksin even had a business involvement in the communication systems for the missile installations, which, if so, would make him a traitor.) Thailand needs to bring this to an end. These are real defense and internal security issues. It is completely unacceptable that Burma target Thailand with North Korean ballistic missiles.
This, and Thai relations with Burma in general, over refugees, migrant workers, narcotics, the Salween dams, etc., should be major issues in the upcoming Thai election. Every candidate, beginning with Democrat Party leader Abhisit Vejjajiva, should be questioned about his or her intended Burma policy, especially in light of these revelations.
Thailand has historically pursued “Bamboo diplomacy.” This policy stresses flexibility (the analogy is the ease with which bamboo bends) if not, as with Switzerland and Sweden, neutrality. One positive consequence of the policy is that Thailand has never been colonized. On the other hand, the country immediately capitulated to the Japanese (just as Sweden did to the Nazis). By doing so, however, it suffered only minimal damage during the war.
Flexibility is an excellent approach for many international policy concerns, but its utility is questionable in the face of distinct and direct threats. Should Thailand accept SPDC intimidation, and the never-ending stream of problems from its neighbor? We would argue that even bamboo diplomacy has limits, and that the targeting of ballistic missiles is one of them. Thai relations with Burma should be completely reevaluated. The best policy for Thailand would be to assist the movement for freedom and democracy in every way that it can. (This extends to India as well.)
Conclusion
The information above is not the type of thing that is normally made public. Even when such situations are known, they are usually kept under wraps. This is the province of diplomats and the intelligence community, and they can handle it. They understand what’s best. The people do not need to know.
We beg to differ. Diplomacy on Burma has achieved nothing since the massacre in 1988, which drew the world’s attention to the country. It is difficult to envision how this nineteen-year record of failure is going to change. For the intelligence community, we would not be surprised if it is completely aware of the substance of this report. Will the spies of the world and their political masters use the information to create pressure for change? While we would certainly hope so, please excuse us if we harbor doubts .
In a democracy, the people have a right to know everything. The basic reason for this is that democracy is a system predicated on and designed to protect human rights. There must be full disclosure, so the people in society can ensure that their various rights, starting with the right to life, and to equality and freedom, are in fact being protected.
In addition, democracy is being applied around the world in its representative form, but it remains government by and for the people. For the people to make the best decisions about whom to elect as their representatives, they must have access to all information that pertains to this choice. They must know everything about the current state of society, and government, so they are able to ask of the candidates for office what they intend to do.
John F. Kennedy saw fit to reveal the presence of missiles in Cuba to Americans and the world. In our own small way, we are trying to do the same thing.
Also, we are only the messengers. Please don’t shoot the messenger. Particularly for Thailand, this is an opportunity to get your foreign policy in order. Please grasp it!
For Burma and diplomacy, we are decidedly skeptical of the appointment by Secretary General Ban Ki-moon of Ibrahim Gambari as special advisor. It is difficult to see how this will accomplish anything. If Mr. Gambari presses, publicly, for Security Council action on the basis of the above information and arguments, we will applaud his appointment. But if, as is most likely, he continues the party line that the U.N. itself has no real power and must defer to the member states on all issues, then his involvement is a waste of time.
This means, yet again, that it falls to the people of Burma, and their international supporters, to instigate change. The people of Burma are ready to go. There is great dissatisfaction inside the country, and a readiness to revolt. The open question though is of timing. All sorts of preparations are undoubtedly in place, but the people are waiting for the right opportunity, for the right time. To this we can only say that there is no need to wait for the death of Than Shwe, or even freedom for Daw Suu. Anytime – Now – is the right time!
Outside of Burma, a decisive timing opportunity is at hand, which the people of the country also can grasp. China is the main supporter for the SPDC. It is clear that if China were to relent in its support, freedom would be much easier to achieve. A worldwide boycott of the Beijing Olympics is going to be launched on August 8th, to press for change on a wide variety of issues (China’s backing of the Sudanese dictatorship and its culpability in the genocide in Darfur, its conquest of Tibet, human rights abuses in China itself, the environmental destruction caused by Chinese consumption of tropical hardwoods and endangered species, etc.). This is one year before the Olympics themselves open, and it also happens to be the anniversary of the 1988 massacre in Burma. Everyone in the pro-democracy movement should join this boycott. While Dictator Watch does not ordinarily organize protests, we are calling for a Worldwide Day of Action, of protests at Chinese embassies in as many different countries as possible, on August 8th. We hope that other Burma organizations will join us in this call, and on the protest line. Boycott the Genocide Olympics!
(Please see www.youtube.com/noolympics)
Most importantly, if we make enough noise on the outside, perhaps the people inside Burma will decide that the time is finally right as well and launch their own revolution for freedom. Daw Aye! Daw Aye! Daw Aye!
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Rogues of the world unite
By Clifford McCoy
CHIANG MAI, Thailand - With the re-establishment of diplomatic ties, Myanmar and North Korea, two of Asia's most reclusive and abusive military-run regimes, have formed what some regional observers fear has already become a destabilizing strategic alliance.
Chief among the concerned parties will be the United States, which has referred to North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" and labeled Myanmar an "outpost of tyranny".
The agreement re-establishing formal bilateral relations was announced on Thursday after a two-hour meeting between North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong-il and Myanmar's Deputy Foreign Minister Kyaw Thu. The four-person North Korean delegation arrived in Yangon on Wednesday for a three-day visit and the move was highly anticipated.
The agreement could make Pyongyang the first country to open an embassy in Myanmar's new capital of Naypyidaw. Other nations have so far maintained their embassies in the old capital Yangon.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said that China, which shares borders and maintains cordial relations with both countries, is "happy to see and welcome the improvement in bilateral ties".
Myanmar, then known as Burma, formally severed relations with Pyongyang in 1983, after three North Korean agents planted a bomb that killed 18 visiting South Korean officials, including the then-deputy prime minister So Suk-chan and three other cabinet ministers. Burmese security forces at the time killed one of the agents, Captain Kim Chi-o, and captured two others, Major Zin Mo and Captain Kang Min-chul. Zin Mo was hanged two years later, while Kang was sentenced to life imprisonment and remains in Insein Prison.
Pyongyang tried on several occasions to re-establish diplomatic ties, but was consistently rebuffed. Burma's reluctance to renew ties was only strengthened when two North Korean terrorists bombed South Korean-run Korean Airlines Flight 858 in Burmese airspace in 1987, killing all 115 people aboard. Bilateral trade, however, continued despite strained diplomatic relations.
After Burma's military junta crushed pro-democracy protests in 1988, it moved to expand its armed forces both to fight insurgents in its border areas as well as to keep the civilian population under control. Weaponry was needed to equip the new units and Myanmar, as the country was officially renamed by the junta, began to search for new global arms suppliers willing to circumvent the arms embargoes it faced from many Western countries.
North Korea, which has a large domestic arms industry and a willingness to accept barter trade for weapons, was a good alternative source. Economic mismanagement and famines in North Korea have left it eager to acquire foreign currency, but also primary resources such as rice, timber and marine resources, all of which Myanmar exports.
An additional bonus was Pyongyang's willingness to defy the international community and sell weapons to Myanmar's generals. Compared with Western arms, North Korea's are cheap, often copies of proven Russian and Chinese designs. These weapons are also similar to weapons already in the Myanmar military's inventory, making them easy for soldiers to operate and maintain.
Secretive military ties
While diplomatic ties were severed, clandestine military ties were apparently re-established in 1999. That coincided with the Myanmar military's director of procurement making a low-profile visit to North Korea that same year. In November 2000, a Myanmar delegation made a secret visit to Pyongyang and held talks with high-ranking officials of the Ministry of the People's Armed Forces, according to Australian defense analyst and Myanmar military expert Andrew Selth.
In June 2001, a North Korean delegation led by vice foreign minister Park Kil-yon met with State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) deputy defense minister Khin Maung Win to discuss cooperation between the two countries' defense industries. Low-key, military-to-military ties have intensified in recent years, with Pyongyang providing weapons, military technology transfers and expertise in underground tunneling used for concealing secret military installations. The arms trade between Myanmar and North Korea has so far been limited to conventional arms and technology transfers, including a major purchase of 130mm M46 field guns in 1999.
Myanmar's most advanced weaponry procurement to date includes anti-ship and surface-to-surface missiles, which are reportedly being fixed on the military's new class of coastal patrol boats. There have also been frequent unexplained visits by North Korean freighters to Myanmar ports in recent years, which have been shrouded in secrecy and tight security.
This has raised suspicions of potentially more sophisticated North Korean arms deliveries, which have been stoked by reports of North Korean technicians based at Myanmar's military bases. Reportedly, 15-20 North Korean technicians have worked at Myanmar's Monkey Point naval base since 2002. Some experts speculate they are there to help install missiles on new naval patrol boats.
North Korea is world-renowned for its expertise in building underground military installations and it appears to be passing these capabilities to the SPDC. A message intercepted by Asian intelligence agencies last year from the new Myanmar capital Naypyidaw confirmed the arrival of North Korean tunneling experts in October.
The SPDC is believed to be building an extensive underground bunker complex beneath its new capital. North Korean experts were also involved in the construction of a massive bunker in 2003 near the central town of Taungdwingyi. The bunker complex, experts say, is apparently part of the SPDC's fears of a preemptive attack by the US, along the lines of its invasion of Iraq.
There have been unconfirmed reports that Myanmar has also tried to acquire more exotic weapons from North Korea. Analyst Selth detailed in his 2004 Burma's North Korean Gambit how the SPDC apparently opened discussions with Pyongyang in early 2002 to purchase one or two small submarines. However, this endeavor was scrapped for unknown reasons in late 2002.
There is some belief among security analysts that the SPDC is interested in acquiring short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). A series of unconfirmed reports has emerged that the military is interested in the North Korean Hwasong SRBM, a Scud-type missile with a range of up to 500 kilometers and a 770-kilogram conventional warhead.
It is unlikely that China would provide such advanced missile technology to Myanmar, which would likely rile the US and regional countries. North Korea, however, is unconcerned about piquing Washington and has already sold estimated 300-350 ballistic missiles to foreign countries and readily makes parts and missile technology available on underground global markets.
The presence of ballistic missiles in Myanmar would likely elicit particularly strong reactions from Thailand and India. A recent report by Jane's Defence Weekly that Thailand recently launched a new missile- and rocket-production program would appear to be a defensive reaction to Myanmar's move to acquire North Korean missile technology.
Nuclear ambitions?
There has also been diplomatic speculation that North Korea is involved in the building of a nuclear test reactor in central Myanmar. The reactor was initially to be built with Russian assistance, but Moscow reportedly pulled out because of Myanmar's inability to pay for the construction. Moreover, it remains unclear why aircraft from North Korea's Air Koryu airline landed at military airfields in central Myanmar in 2003, or what North Korean technicians were doing at Myothit near Natmauk, upper Myanmar, around the same time.
Some diplomats are concerned that the SPDC may be interested in acquiring some sort of nuclear weapon, or at least obtaining enough nuclear material to make a so-called "dirty bomb". The SPDC claims it wants a nuclear reactor for peaceful medical research and maybe to generate power and strongly maintains that it has no interest in making a nuclear bomb.
Some believe that the junta sees the potential upside to North Korea's recent nuclear brinksmanship against the United States. Representatives of North Korea's Daesong Economic Group were in Myanmar in 2003 and the company has a record of secretly proliferating nuclear and missile technology, including to Pakistan. Opposition media sources based in Thailand have also reported that the SPDC has been sending officers to North Korea for nuclear-related training, including 80 officers in November 2003.
These reports may be jumping the gun, as all the officers were members of the air defense and artillery divisions of the army and could have been sent to gain expertise in new artillery or surface-to-air missiles. Moreover, there has been some speculation by diplomats and intelligence officials that Myanmar may be paying for the arms and technology transfers with drugs. This connection has not been substantiated with hard proof, but there is plenty of circumstantial evidence.
A February 16 US Congressional Research Service report, "North Korea Crime-for-Profit Activities", accused Pyongyang of involvement in heroin and methamphetamine smuggling and the production of counterfeit currency and cigarettes. North Korean heroin shipments have been interdicted in the past, but it remains unclear whether Pyongyang was the owner or merely the shipping agent of the narcotics.
There is at least some connection to Myanmar, though not necessarily to the SPDC. Heroin seized in Taiwan in 2002 and in Australia in 2003 was labeled with the Double-UO-Globe brand. This brand of opium is produced by the United Wa State Army, which operates in northern Myanmar. Although North Korea is believed to produce its own heroin and methamphetamines, it could be supplementing its own production with that from Myanmar.
A 2003 article in the Far Eastern Economic Review quoted US intelligence officials as saying North Korean agents had been seen in the Golden Triangle. While it is unlikely that the SPDC would directly hand drugs to North Korea, it has become clear in recent years that despite rhetoric to the contrary, the regime is involved in the production and trafficking of drugs within Myanmar and to neighboring countries. Army units have been accused of taxing the trade, providing protection to production laboratories, and allowing drug barons to invest money in legitimate businesses.
One advantage for North Korea in normalizing bilateral relations with Myanmar would be to establish a formal diplomatic channel to pressure the junta to crack down on North Korean refugees escaping across the Chinese border, traveling through Myanmar and across to Thailand, from where they are repatriated to South Korea. Growing refugee flows have become a point of embarrassment for Pyongyang and it undoubtedly would like to see the route through Myanmar severed. Myanmar security forces would also likely have knowledge of the movement of North Korean refugees through their contacts with ethnic insurgent ceasefire groups along the Chinese border and hence would be in a position to interdict the refugees if ordered to do so.
Yet there are also risks to normalizing ties. South Korea has become one of Myanmar's leading trade partners and a major investor, and establishing formal diplomatic relations with North Korea could risk antagonizing the budding commercial relationship. The decision will likely also be unpopular with the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations, particularly with member countries Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia. Myanmar is a member of the grouping.
Myanmar's apparent desire to acquire power-projection capabilities makes Thailand in particular nervous, considering the two traditional adversaries share long stretches of contested border areas and Bangkok has quietly provided sanctuary and support to armed ethnic insurgent groups. Myanmar's army and Thai security forces have occasionally clashed in recent years.
Meanwhile, both Malaysia and Singapore would likely view any sort of North Korean military presence in the region as a destabilizing influence. Myanmar's attempts to acquire SRBMs, submarines and nuclear capability from Pyongyang could spark a new arms race, one that few regional governments could afford.
The SPDC may be hoping that the re-establishment of diplomatic relations with North Korea will give it an ally against Western pressure, especially from the US. It may turn out, however, that the opposite is true. Both regimes have well-documented histories of human-rights abuses, narcotics trafficking, money-laundering, human trafficking and forced labor, and establishing formal bilateral relations and strategic linkages will likely make the US and the European Union take greater notice of their interactions.
The US already views Myanmar as a rogue state and some US politicians called for adding Yangon to President George W Bush's "axis of evil" after the SPDC's violent attack in May 2003 on democratic opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi's motorcade. Until now, Myanmar has not been a strategic concern to the US, but a substantial improvement in Myanmar's military capabilities and closer ties with a proliferating North Korea could quickly change that calculus.
Clifford McCoy is a Chiang Mai-based journalist.
(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
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